Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts by Woo, Margaret Y.K.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 8 Number 3 
9-1-1999 
Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts 
Margaret Y.K. Woo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Margaret Y. Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 581 
(1999). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol8/iss3/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 1999 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association
LAW AND DISCRETION IN THE CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE COURTSt
Margaret Y. K. Woot
Abstract: The last twenty years of Chinese legal reforms have been particularly
interesting to scholars and activists alike. During this period, Chinese legal reforms have
moved from purely substantive changes in economic laws to the realm of domestic
structural reforms of the court system. Today, legal reformers are discussing the use of
open trials, adversarial advocacy, and even judicial independence. This Article explores
how far some of these reforms may go by considering the path of structural and
procedural changes adopted by the Chinese courts in the past twenty years. It includes an
analysis of the tension faced by all legal systems in balancing law and predictability with
equity and discretion. It focuses on how the Chinese have utilized an ideology of
supervision in maintaining this balance, and predicts the future course of legal reforms in
China.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since initiating economic reforms in 1978, China has touted its
commitment to becoming a state governed by law. The idea has been put
forth that rules, instead of the arbitrary wishes of powerful individuals, will
govern affairs in the country.' It is a movement toward the belief that rules,
and legal rules in particular, will provide predictability and greater justice by
ensuring that like cases are treated alike. This commitment has been tested
in recent years as the problem of corruption and abuse of discretionary
power by Communist Party and local officials has escalated alongside
continuing economic reforms.
Interestingly, China's recent efforts to contain discretionary outcomes
also reveal a philosophical ambivalence about the desirability of doing so.
The Chinese government has enacted procedural laws to ensure certainty
and stability in its legal processes, but these laws in many respects codify the
t This article will also be included in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW, to be published by the
University of Washington Press. Parties wishing to reprint this article should contact both the Pacific Rim
Law & Policy Journal and the University of Washington Press.
Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law, B.A., Brown University, J.D., New
York University School of Law. Research Associate, East Asian Legal Studies Center, Harvard Law
School
1 See particularly Deng Xiaoping's Address, BEtJING XINHUA, Sept. 1, 1982, reprinted in FOREIGN
BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, DAILY REPORT-CHINA ("FBIS-CHI"), Sept. 1, 1982, at K12. The
idea of yifa banshi (to act according to law) is a consistent theme going back to the late 1970's. But
whether this idea is equivalent to the rule of law (as discussed infra) is contested both within and outside of
Chinese legal academic circles.
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tradition of informality in adjudication. Anti-corruption regulations have
been enacted, but judges are still free to base their decisions on sources
outside the judicial record, including ex parte contacts. The country also has
an elaborate procedural framework for supervising the work of its judges,
but this framework functions to ensure ideologically correct results.
China's ambivalence about the rule of law may be an inevitable result
of the inherent tension between rules and discretion present in any legal
system. In part, however, it is also illustrative of how the Chinese
government has weighed the balance between rules and discretion. In some
circumstances, the Chinese legal system appears exceedingly rule-bound and
discretion is tightly constrained, while in others, discretion reigns.
Overall, this balance reflects the evolving role of courts in
contemporary Chinese society. That is, Chinese courts have operated
primarily as "law-applying" institutions that resolve private disputes and
maintain social order by discretionary adaptation of the law to particular
circumstances and individual cases. Where adjudication is not viewed as a
forum for making law, Chinese courts have served less as "law-making"
institutions. Thus, although there are signs of change, courts have been
more concerned with substantive justice than with ensuring uniformity of
results or with developing general rules of application with each
adjudication. Chinese courts have also been more constrained in challenging
state infringements, particularly when such infringements are codified or
enacted as statutes or regulations.2
This Article examines how the historic Chinese preference for
discretion and informality in the administration of justice has been retained
and reflected in the judicial decisionmaking process and in procedural codes.
It focuses on how the Chinese ideology of jiandu (supervision) dominates
individual judicial work and ensures ideologically correct results. In so
doing, this Article seeks to identify some parameters of law and discretion
within the Chinese construct of judicial work, the role of courts, and the
Chinese vision of the rule of law.
2 See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa [Administrative Litigation Law of
the People's Republic of China] (adopted Apr. 4, 1990) [hereinafter Administrative Litigation Law],
reprinted and translated in I CHINA L. REFERENCE SERVICE (ASIA L. & PRACTICE), Ref. No.
1100/89.04.04 (1996) [hereinafter I CHINA L. REFERENCE]. Article 2 of the Administrative Litigation Law
specifies that courts review administrative decisions to ensure that they are "in accordance with law." Id.
art. 2. The Administrative Litigation Law does not anticipate challenges to the law or regulations
themselves. (People's courts are authorized to determine whether a challenged administrative decision is
lawful and in accord with relevant laws and regulations.). Id. See also Pitman B. Potter, The
Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Reform, in DOMESTIC LAW
REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 270, 288 (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994).
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II. THE TENSION BETWEEN LAW AND DISCRETION
The term "rule of law" is not easy to define. Blackstone defines law
as "a rule of action applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action.",3
According to John Rawls, rule of law is manifested in formal justice, or "the
regular and impartial administration of public rules."4 Under this concept of
the rule of law, justice requires fair procedures and consistent enforcement
of the law in the form of trials, hearings, rules of evidence, and due process.
In part, strict procedure also requires decisionmakers to relinquish some of
their human discretionary powers and "give up some of the decisional
freedom we each have as persons when deciding what, all things considered,
is best to do."5 The rule of law thus implies formal rules and procedures,
with the formal application of rules curbing human discretion.
By extension, curbing the discretionary actions of decisionmakers
through law can also lead to what Albert Dicey calls the "supremacy or
predominance of regular law as opposed to influence of arbitrary power,"
and general rules of constitutional law "resulting from the ordinary law of
the land.",6 Law is held up as equally applicable to every individual in
society, including government powerholders. In the Western tradition, rule
of law also means legal limits on governmental powers. Rule of law has
both a private and a public dimension-private in guaranteeing predictability
for economic transactions and resolving private disputes, and public in
restraining the powers of officials and regulating the transfer of political
power.7
Substantively, rule of law is integral to the protection of individual
liberty and dignity. In theory, strict procedures guarantee greater
predictability, and greater predictability in turn increases one's options and,
hence, one's individual liberties.8 In sum, rule of law ensures that
"government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced
beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan
one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge." 9
3 THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LAW: SELECTIONS FROM BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 27 (Gareth Jones ed., 1973).
4 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1st ed. 5th prtg. 1973).
5 Michael Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 318 (1985).
6 ALBERT VENN DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202-
03 (1959).
7 KATHRYN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER 12 (1996).
8 F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-73 (1944).
' Id. at 80.
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Formal rules, however, are in tension with the concept of
individualized justice. Discretion is necessary in handling the gap between
rhetoric and reality in the legal system.10 Max Weber identified the duality
of formal rules and discretion as the tension between "order" and "justice,"
with the former implying consistency, certainty, and stability, and the latter
implying fair treatment ascertained by a judgment of particular
circumstances."t In Aristotle's view, the tension between formal law and
personal discretion was to be reconciled by the fair-minded judge willing to
go beyond the letter of the law to mete out justice. 2
Every legal system must balance these two conflicting goals: the goal
of certainty, which is guaranteed by formal rules, and the goal of
individualized justice, which is provided for through the exercise of human
discretion. Historically, in the Anglo-American legal tradition, this
dichotomy was represented by a dual system of law courts and equity
courts. 13  Until this century, when these two courts were merged, the law
courts followed formalized writs and rules, while the equity courts operated
under broader principles of right and justice and looser procedural rules. 14
The tension between law and discretion is also felt in the Chinese
legal system. In theory, this tension can be discerned from the ambiguity
10 Keith Hawkins, The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science, in THE
USES OF DISCRETION 11, 37 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992). According to Hawkins, the functional benefits of
discretion can serve other functional benefits for the legal system, such as obscuring lack of consensus or
ambiguities in policy and avoiding the use of costly formal procedures in the law.
1 The values of order and justice are related to Weber's categories of formal and substantive legal
rationality. Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Max Weber, in LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE 69, 85
(David Sugarman ed., 1983).
12 ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 146-47 (J.A.K. Thomson
trans., 1953).
13 Functioning side by side, and later as a single, merged court system, these two systems effected
some balance between adherence to the rule of law and the exercise of discretion. The concept of equity
developed both into a "series of technical remedies and substantive provisions and an equitable approach to
law, making the world whole." PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE 21 (1990); see
generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in Historical Perspectives, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1987).
14 See Subrin, supra note 13. Of course, some Anglo-American legal scholars have argued that the
application of all rules of law necessarily entails the application of human discretion. These scholars, such
as Mary Jane Radin, have argued that "rules are neither formal in the traditional sense, nor eternal, nor
existing independently of us; and so we know that every application of them is a reinterpretation." Thus,
what is needed is a reinterpretation of "rule of law, not of individuals," because if "law cannot be formal
rules, its people cannot be mere functionaries." Mary Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.
L. REV. 781, 819 (1989). Others, meanwhile, have noted the growth of judicial discretion in the American
courts. Some have explained this movement as a general trend toward pragmatism as opposed to
principles. See A.S. Atyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Judicial Process and the Law,
65 IOWA L. REv. 1249, 1249-72 (1981). Others, however, have argued that this growth is due to the rise in
"public law" litigation-litigation that deals with complex public policy issues. See Carl E. Schneider,
Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View, in THE USES OF DISCRETION, supra note 10, at 47, 58-59.
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surrounding the meaning of the Chinese term fazhi, translated both as "rule
of law" and as "rule by law." While rule by law is an instrumentalist view of
law meaning to govern by the use of laws, rule of law means that people
should obey the law and their actions should be guided by it. Similarly, the
government should also be subject to law and its discretionary powers
curbed by law. 15 The ambiguity around the termfazhi reflects a continuing
reluctance in China to permit laws which curb the government's discretion.
The preference for human discretion and attention to individual
circumstances is reflected philosophically by the fact thatfazhi still appears
to share importance with renzhi (rule by man) in China. Among three
different schools of Chinese legal thought that address the dichotomy of
fazhi and renzhi, none completely rejects the need for human discretion in
law.16 The reluctance to adopt rule of law may be grounded in a fear that
law will become "omnipotent and a source of superstitious power." 17
As we look more closely at the Chinese legal system, it is clear that
discretion is an integral part of it. Indeed, some discretion exists in every
legal system. But how is law and discretion balanced in the Chinese legal
system, and what form does discretion take? In this Article, I will focus
primarily on judicial discretion, that is, the discretion of judges as
decisionmakers. As elaborated below, the concept of discretion is not
monolithic, and any discussion of curbing discretion must differentiate
between different types of discretion. In the Chinese context, recent efforts
to constrain discretion through procedural codes and professionalization of
the courts have nevertheless left room for discretion.
III. THREE TYPES OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Several types of discretion exist within any legal system, and the
constraints on discretion may vary accordingly. The rigid application of
1 The value of the rule of law is its ability to restrain arbitrary power, that is, to prevent a
government "from changing the law retroactively or abruptly or secretly whenever this suits its purposes."
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 219 (1979). Individual freedom is thus secured as individuals have
a stable framework for planning their lives and actions. HAYEK, supra note 8.
16 One school argues forfazhi, but does not totally reject renzhi because law must be implemented
by human beings. This school advocates a sound cadre system with qualified legal personnel and
professionals. A second school argues for the rejection of renzhi, but only rejects renzhi with regard to
those who abuse power, and not with regard to revolutionary leaders and the masses. A third school of
thought rejects the focus on rule of law and rule of man and instead embraces a new category that would
include the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party as necessary for ideological and ethical guidance.
ZHONGGUO FAXUE XIN SIWEI [NEW THOUGHTS ON CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE] 29-31 (Yan Ganqiao ed.,
1989).
"7 CARLOS Lo, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENING: LEGAL THEORY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN DENG'S
CHINA 48 (1995).
SEPT. 1999
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
legal requirements can run counter to three different types of judicial
discretion: (1) "fact-based" discretion, which is applied to tailor the result of
a case to its individual facts and circumstances; (2) "self-interested"
discretion, which is applied to suit the economic or relational interests of the
judge deciding the case; and (3) "ideological" discretion, which is applied to
achieve results consistent with a particular public policy or ideology.'
8
The first form of judicial discretion involves the relaxation of rigid
rules of law to render individual justice in a particular situation. 19 The
second involves the application of discretion by the judge in a personal or
self-serving way.2° By permitting the substitution of the decisionmaker's
own personal standards for the public legal standards, this second type of
discretion, the self-interested discretion, may be viewed as an abuse of
discretion and is a window for judicial corruption. The third type of
discretion is discretion applied to achieve a political or ideological end.21 In
the United States, such discretion is theoretically constrained by the
Constitution. Just as arbitrary and intrusive actions by the state are to be
constrained by the due process clause and the extensive jurisprudence on
substantive due process, the political question doctrine also sets limits on
what judges in the United States may do.
All three types of discretion are evident in the Chinese legal system.
Individual judges in China, in deciding cases, appear not to be constrained
rigidly by the four comers of black letter law. Their approach to judging
reflects a blend of personal discretion designed to attain justice based on
individual circumstance, self-interested discretion, and ideological discretion
imposed by the state.
A. Seeking Truth from Facts: Fact-Based Discretion
Chinese judicial officers are guided in their work by the old adage of
"seeking truth from facts, correcting error whenever discovered." In all
cases, the emphasis is on facts and on assessing the correct outcome from
18 Hawkins, supra note 10. Various scholars have categorized discretion differently. For example,
Sneider has identified four types of discretion: (1) "khadi" (or "qadi") discretion, under which decisions
are based on an indiscriminate mixture of legal, ethical, emotional, and political considerations; (2)
"rule-failure" discretion, which is applied when rules fail to cover all the circumstances the world presents;
(3) "rule-building" discretion, which is exercised from a belief that better rules could be developed if
decisionmakers were allowed some discretion to develop rules as they go along; and (4) "rule-compromise"
discretion, which is discretion that is passed on to the decisionmaker when the rulemaking body cannot
agree. Schneider, supra note 14, at 61-65.
19 ARISTOTLE, supra note 12.
20 HOFFER, supra note 13, at 19.
21 Id.
VOL. 8 No. 3
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CHINESE COURTS
the facts rather than on following the technicalities of law. Indeed, in a
survey by Arthur Rosett and Lucie Cheng, judges expressed the view that
their decisions should go beyond the technical aspects of law and should be
reasonable and appropriate to the litigants' feelings and individual
circumstances. In the interviews, economic and civil law judges expressed
hesitation in making rigid zero-sum determinations for or against a party, for
such determinations tend to be more disruptive and less harmonious.22
These judges are avidly concerned with balancing legalism against social
norms and maintaining harmonious relations and are more inclined to render
results that preserve relations than to uphold the strict prescriptions of law.23
To some extent, this emphasis on the specific facts and equities of
individual cases may be explained by the still inadequate legal training of
Chinese judicial workers. For many years, judges were appointed from the
ranks of the military and had little background in law or adjudication. In
1989, only ten percent of the judges and procurators at all levels had an
education above college level, and in 1991, only sixty-five percent of all
24
court personnel were college-educated. Only recently have judges been
required to pass a test that establishes a minimum level of competency in
law, and only in 1995 did China enact the Judges Law, which specifies the
educational and legal requirements for membership in the judiciary.25 These
recent efforts to develop a body of young legal professionals with a greater
consciousness of law may help China establish a more law-oriented
judiciary.26
22 Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded Factors in the
Transformation from Hierarchy to Market, 1979-89, 5 J. CHINESE L. 143, 224-25 (1991); see also James V.
Feinerman et al., Law, Contracts and Economics Modernization Lessons from the Recent Chinese
Economic Rural Reform, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 319 (1987). Economic court judges cited the old adage
heqing, heli, hefa (according to relationship, rightness, and the law) as their guideposts in decisionmaking.
Chen & Rossett, supra.
Cheng & Rossett, supra note 22.
24 Li Maoguan, Why Laws Go Unenforced, BEIJING REv., Sept. 18-24, 1989, at 17, 19. The goal
was to have 70% of court personnel, 80% of all judges, and 90% of heads of courts be college educated by
1996. Liu Linshan, Jianshe Gaosuzhi Zhuanyehua Faguan Ganbu Duiwu [Building a Team of High
Quality and Professionalized Judicial Cadres], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Aug. 27, 1990, at 1. In
1993, China had 30,401 full-time lawyers and 16,793 part-time lawyers. 1994 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN
[1994 CHINA LAW YEARBOOK] 1085 (1994). China also hopes to increase the number of lawyers to
150,000 by the end of the century. Legal System to See 'Major Reforms,' BEIJING XINHUA, Oct. 15, 1993,
reprinted in FBIS-CHI, Oct. 19, 1993, at 12.
25 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Faguanfa [Judges Law of the People's Republic of China]
(adopted Feb. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Judges Law], translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 1995 69-81 (1996) [hereinafter LAWS OF THE PRC, 1995].
26 Government to Promote Quality of Lawyers, BEIJING XINHUA, reprinted in FBIS-CHI, May 22,
1991, at 40.
SEPT. 1999
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
More fundamentally, however, the judicial emphasis on facts over the
rigidity of law may never completely disappear in China because the
preference for bending the rules to ensure a harmonious outcome can be
traced to a historical preference for informality and the continuing belief in
preserving harmony. This reluctance to follow formal laws has roots in
traditional Chinese culture, where social pressure was preferred over the use
of force by the state. Confucian morality, in particular, strongly emphasized
maintaining social harmony through the preservation and regulation of
personal relationships. Contrary to the universalism of formal law,
Confucianism stressed particularism and personal treatment, and its
"humanist universalism was always to be adapted to local circumstances and
relational contexts. 27 This traditional preference for informality and
particularism was later reinforced by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought,
which emphasized a "mass line" approach to the administration of justice.28
Hence, in the early years of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"),
disputes were often resolved through mediation by local entities such as
families, villages, and neighborhood committees.
Today, litigation in. the public courts is still viewed with disfavor in
China, as it represents a breakdown in relationships that should be avoided,
or if at all possible, repaired. Good outcomes do not simply prohibit or
mandate, but preserve order and harmony. It is expected, then, that judicial
decisions will render individualized justice by tailoring outcomes to give
something to everyone, rather than by uniformly applying the law. Judicial
decisions adjust future human relations rather than simply allocate
entitlements. As such, Chinese judges, similar to other socialist judges, are
"social crisis managers rather than arbiters of private disputes. 2 9
Perhaps more importantly, this preference for fact-based discretion
may be attributable to the limited role that courts have played in China.
Chinese judges apply rather than make law. Adjudication is not viewed as a
site for lawmaking with decisions coming out of private disputes having
broader institutional consequences. Unlike common law countries, where
judicial interpretations and decisions are categorized and then applied in
subsequent cases, each adjudication in the Chinese system stands apart and
27 Wm. Theodore DeBary, The "Constitutional Tradition" in China, 9 J. CHINESE L. 7, 10 (1995).
28 For discussions of Mao's mass line approach to the administration of justice, see generally S.
LENG & H. CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS (1985). Under the
mass line approach to the administration of justice, the prescribed method is to seek the advice of the
masses both prior to enacting a law and after a law is enacted. This method is called "from the masses and
to the masses." Wu Jianwu, Building New China's Legal System, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1, 15
(1983).
29 INGA MARKOVITZ, IMPERFECT JUSTICE 45 (1995).
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on its own. 30 Although the Supreme People's Court (the highest court in the
Chinese legal system) has the authority to interpret "questions concerning
specific applications of laws and decrees ' 31 and has handed down model
decisions as well as official interpretations, there is as yet no systematic
method to synthesize lower court decisions into general rules of application.
Hence, lower Chinese judges may be more concerned with the immediate
result before them, and less with the possibility that their actions may be part
of a greater legal fabric. Chinese judges thus have a greater potential to
render individualized justice and at the same time reach inconsistent results
in different cases.
B. Self-Interested Discretion
Not only can individualized justice lead to nonuniformity and work
against predictability, but it can also open the door to corruption, a darker
side to judicial discretion. The preference for informality and the focus on
personal relationships in the administration of justice has led to the opening
of a "backdoor" in judicial decisionmaking. Through this backdoor system,
personal appeals, which may include the payment of money, are used to
obtain favorable judicial outcomes. This corruption may take the form of
gifts or dinner invitations to judges or payments to a close relative of a judge
as an appeal for a favorable outcome. In the court system, cases resolved
30 However, the Supreme People's Court does guide lower courts by publishing opinions and
interpretations in the Supreme People's Court Gazette, as well as by issuing internal instructions. The
Supreme People's Court may also give its opinion on particular cases coming from the lower courts. See
Article 33 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts, which stipulates that "[tihe Supreme People's Court
gives interpretation on questions concerning specific application of laws and decrees in trial proceedings."
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Fayuan Zuzhifa [Organic Law of the People's Courts of the
People's Republic of China] (adopted July 1, 1979, amended Sept. 2, 1983) [hereinafter People's Courts
Organic Law] art. 33, translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1983-1986 37-46(1987) [hereinafter LAWS OF THE PRC, 1983-1986]. See also DR. NANPING LIU, OPINIONS OF THE
SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN CHINA 74 (1997).
31 People's Courts Organic Law, supra note 30.
32 According to Cai Cheng, then Minister of Justice, corrupt practices of judicial personnel include
using public funds for private purposes, accepting bribes, and using the power of their post for private
gains. Cai Cheng, Minister of Justice, Promote Incorruptibility Among Ranks of Judicial Administrative
Personnel, GUANGMING RIBAO [GUANGMING DAILY], May 9, 1991, at I, translated in Minister of Justice
on Judicial Honesty, FBIS-CHI, May 31, 1991, at 22-24; see also Judicial Agencies Should Take the Lead
in Fighting Corruption and Encouraging Clean Administration, BEIJING FAZHI RIBAO [BEIJING LEGAL SYS.
DAILY], Oct. 11, 1993, at 1, translated in Commentator Stresses Judicial Role in Fighting Corruption,
FBIS-CHI, Oct. 25, 1993, at 21-22. That judges are part of this problem is clear from a 1991 amendment
to the Civil Procedure Law, which specifically prohibits judges from accepting "dinner invitations or gifts
from litigants or their legal representatives." Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa [Civil
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted Apr. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Civil Procedure
Law] art. 44, translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1990-1992 185-240 (1993).
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through this "backdoor" are loosely referred to as renqing an (cases resolved
by doing a favor) and guanxi an (cases resolved through personal relations).
Corruption was one of the principal complaints made by students in
the pro-democracy movement of 1989. The growth of corruption has even
been recognized officially, and the government has agreed that, unless
brought under control, corruption will pose a threat to national reforms.
33
The government has attempted to address such self-serving discretion
through legal sanctions as well as through Party discipline. Hence, the 1979
Criminal Code (amended in 1996), as well as supplementary regulations,
specifically impose penalties for corruption. Yet, growing materialism and
new opportunities provided by the reformed political-economic structure
have only added to the momentum of corrupt practices.34
In an effort to stem the phenomena of renqing an and guanxi an,
procedural codes and directives have been issued to prohibit judicial
personnel from working on cases in which they have personal interests. For
example, several provinces and cities have issued new directives that
prohibit former judicial personnel from appearing as legal representatives in
a court at which they were originally employed and close relatives of cadres
of the court from appearing as legal representatives in the court.35  Court
employees are officially prohibited from accepting or soliciting bribes, being
involved in business, stealing public property, or letting nepotism or
personal ties influence their decisions.36  To avoid compromising their
judgments, members of investigating teams are not permitted to stay in
luxury hotels, accept food, drink, or gifts, or buy goods that are in short
supply on their tours of duty.37
It is unclear, however, whether these directives will have any
long-term effects in curbing corruption. At least one former judge confided
The law also authorizes the procuracy to lodge a protest where "the judge is found to have taken
bribes, conducted malpractice out of personal considerations, or misused the law in rendering judgments
during the trial of the case." Id. art. 185(4). See also Article 179(4), which authorizes the people's courts
to conduct a trial de novo in instances of such violations. Id. art. 179(4).
33 The disagreement is not over the presence but rather the source of corruption (within the reforms
or within socialism) and over the form of remedy (expansion of reform or transformation of the regime).
For an interesting analysis of different Chinese views on corruption (i.e., official, pro-democracy, reformist,
and conservative views), see generally Richard Levy, Corruption, Economic Crime and Social
Transformation Since the Reforms: The Debate in China, 33 AUSTRALIAN J. CHINESE AFF. 1 (1995).
Reform advocates argue for a system of law that would outline legitimate and illegitimate practices. Id.
34 JULIA KWONG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN CHINA 119-36(1997).
35 Huibi Renqing [Withdraw from Personal Favors], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], May 7, 1995, at
5.
36 Id.
37 Wo Guo Shenji Duiwu Zhongyu Zhishou Lianjie Fenggong [My Country's Auditing Teams Are
True, Upright, and Honest in Performing Their Official Duties], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], July
23, 1988, at 1.
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that litigants in close to sixty percent of the cases she handled in the late
1980s approached her with some kind of money or gift. 38 Legal newspapers
in China are replete with accounts of the qingguan (honest judge) in an
effort to promote the value of judicial honesty in popular culture. According
to one profile of an "honest" judge that was published in the Shanghai Legal
Systems News, one hardworking judge refused gifts and money worth
20,000 yuan in 1995 alone.39
Self-interested discretion also takes the form of local protectionism
(difang baohu zhuyi). Local protectionism is a serious problem in all
Chinese courts, and is a particular problem in the economic courts, which
are responsible for handling economic disputes involving the state. Local
protectionism occurs when a court refuses to accept or delays a case brought
by a party from outside the area, competes with other courts for jurisdiction
over cases, or favors local parties in adjudication, mediation, and the
enforcement of judgments.40  This problem arises because judges are
typically drawn from the area in which they reside and is exacerbated by the
fact that the budget for each court is determined by the local government
where the court sits.41 Local allocation of funds for judicial services has led
to inconsistent levels of service from province to province and has also
rendered courts dependent on the whims of local ties and relationships.
Hence, it is in the self-interest of a judge to protect local litigants by either
taking jurisdiction over such cases and issuing rulings favorable to local
litigants or refusing to enforce unfavorable rulings rendered by other courts
42against local litigants. The most recent efforts to combat local
protectionism, such as those in Shanghai, boast of cooperative agreements
(similar to treaties) between courts to assist each other in cross-jurisdictional
investigation and enforcement.43
38 Personal interview of a former judge in Boston, Mass. in Fall 1997. Judge's name and court
withheld by request.
39 Ji Fang, Hao Yi Ge Qing Guan [What an Honest Judge], SHANGHAI FAZHIBAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL
Sys. DAILY], Dec. 25, 1997, at 2.
40 ZHONGGUO FAXUE XtN SIWEI, supra note 16 at 257; Cong Yi, Fandui Jingji Shenpan Zhong De
Difang Baohuzhuyi [Oppose Local Protectionism in the Adjudication of Economic Cases], MINZHU YU
FAZHI [LAW & DEMOCRACY], no. 6 (1990), at 2; Zhang Youyu, Fandui Jingji Zhifa Zhong de Difang
Baohuzhuyi [Oppose Local Protectionism in the Enforcement of Economic Law] MINZHU YU FAZHI [LAW
& DEMOCRACY], no. 1 (1991), at 14-15.
41 For example, judges' salaries are in part determined by the local government. Judges Law, supra
note 25, art. 36. See Jerome Cohen, Reforming China 's Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 793-804
(1997).
42 Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Enforcement of Civil
Judgments, 10 COLUM J. ASIAN L. 1, 41-49 (1996).
43 Wang Huangmei, Yong Sifa Xiezhu Wang, Po Difang Baohu Shan [Using the Legal Contract Net
to Pierce the Umbrella of Legal Protectionism], SHANGHAI FAZHIBAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL Sys. DAILY],
May 5, 1997, at 1.
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C. Ideological Discretion
The third type of judicial discretion in China may be termed
"ideological discretion"--that is, discretion applied by judges to achieve
politically and ideologically correct results as defined by the state. By
definition, judicial decisionmaking in China entails application of both law
and changing Communist Party policy. Indeed, this philosophy of judicial
work is mandated by the 1982 PRC Constitution, which provides that all
legal work must be guided by four fundamental principles: "the leadership
of the Communist Party of China, . . . the guidance of Marxism-Leninism
and Mao Zedong Thought, . . .adhere[nce] to the people's democratic
dictatorship and [adherence to] the socialist road."" Thus, not only is the
substance of law determined by Party policy, 45 but the interpretation and
application of law remains subject to changes in Party policy. At least one
Chinese scholar has noted that when there is no applicable law or when the
Party's policy is better fitted to a case, the courts will enforce the Party's
current policy.46 Even the Supreme People's Court, in its interpretation of
law, apparently retains the flexibility to change its position should Party
47policy so require.
In a more invidious way, Party influence can lead to ideological
interference in the judicial resolution of individual cases. In the early years
of the PRC legal system, the decision in every case had to be discussed with
the secretary of the local political legal affairs committee (zhengfa
weiyuanhui), in a practice called shuji pi'an (review by Party secretary).
Although this practice is discouraged today and there is no statutory
authority for it, the Party itself has continued to intervene whenever it finds a
case to be important or difficult or to have socially significant implications.
" Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the People's Republic of China] (adopted
Dec. 4, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 PRC Constitution], Preamble, translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1979-1982 4 (1987) [hereinafter LAWS OF THE PRC, 1979-1982]; see also Chang
Gong, Renmin Sifa Gongzuo De Hao Zhang [A Fine Statute on the People's Judicature] FAXUE YANJIU
[STUD. IN L.], no. 4 (1979), at 35-36; Zhang Jinqing & Xie Bongyu, Dull Shenpan Yu Dang De Lingdao
[Independent Adjudication and the Party's Guidance], FAXUE YANJIU [STUD. IN L.], no. 2 (1980), at 27-28.
45 As a practical matter, legislation originates from the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") and must
be approved by the CCP leadership before its promulgation by the NPC. Increasingly, however, Chinese
lawmaking is a "multi-arena" process, with drafts passing through the CCP, the State Council, and the NPC
system. Murray Scot Tanner, Organizations and Politics in China 's Post-Mao Law-Making System, in
DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA, supra note 2, at 56, 57.
46 Liu Nanping, "Judicial Review" in China: A Comparative Perspective, 14 REv. SOCIALIST L. 241,
249 (1988).
47 Liu Nanping, An Ignored Source of Chinese Law: The Gazette of the Supreme People's Court, 5
CONN. J. INT'L. L. 271, 312 (1989).
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The ability of the Party or state to guide outcomes in individual cases
is ensured, as a practical matter, by the authority of the Ministry of Justice
(and, de facto, the Party) to dismiss judicial workers. The Ministry of
Justice has the power to transfer or discharge judges and has apparently used
this power against judges who have decided cases contrary to the dictates of
the Ministry of Justice or Party policy.48 Similarly, it has also been reported
that Party officials have discharged or transferred judges who have decided
cases contrary to Party dictates.4
IV. THE ROLE OF PROCEDURE TO CONSTRAIN JUDICIAL DISCRETION
According to Philip Selznick, rule of law "has to do mainly with how
policies and rules are made and applied rather than with their content. 50
Fair and predictable rules make it "possible to foresee with fair certainty
how the authority will use its coercive powers in a given circumstance.' In
the context of adjudication, formal procedure can empower the aggrieved
individual to bring suit in court. When its ideal function is realized, formal
procedure can serve the values of equality, access, autonomy, and openness
as a check on the abuse of discretion in a legal system.52
Since 1978, the Chinese government has taken a number of steps to
bolster procedural regularity as well as substantive rules of law. The last
fifteen years witnessed the promulgation of China's Criminal Procedure
Law, which was adopted in 1979 and amended in 1996, the Civil Procedure
Law, which was adopted for trial implementation in 1982 and revised and
finalized in 1991, and the Administrative Litigation Law, which was adopted
in 1989. 53 While civil and criminal procedures regulate the manner in which
'8 ZHONGGUO FAXUE XIN SIWEI, supra note 40.
'9 Id. at 248.
" PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY & INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 11 (1969).
51 HAYEK, supra note 8, at 72. By contrast, legal realists and critical legal studies scholars believe
that legal rules and principles are merely words used to rationalize decisions that have already been reached
for other reasons.
32 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION
214 (1993). In the Anglo-American system, these values are reflected in the procedural guarantees of
ready and easy access to the courts, broad discovery to uncover evidence in the hands of indifferent or
hostile organizations, and a jury trial by a group of fellow citizens. Id.
53 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa [Criminal Procedure Law of the People's
Republic of China] (adopted July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure Law],
translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1996 63-114 (1997) [hereinafter LAWS OF
THE PRC 1996]. The revised Criminal Procedure Law was adopted at the Fourth Session of the Eighth
National People's Congress on March 17, 1996, and became effective on January 1, 1997. The Civil
Procedure Law was issued for trial implementation in 1982 and was substantially revised in 1991 for
formal promulgation. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) [Civil Procedure Law of
the People's Republic of China (For Trial Implementation)] (adopted Mar. 8, 1982) [hereinafter Civil
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civil and criminal cases proceed through the court system, the administrative
litigation law is unique in providing judicial control over public agencies by
allowing private citizens to challenge administrative actions in the courts.
These laws were designed, in significant measure, to provide consistency
and regularity where none had existed during the chaotic period of China's
Cultural Revolution. As is true of the regular and impartial administration of
public rules generally, these procedures were also designed to foster greater
resort to the judicial process and greater acceptance of judicial results as
well as to promote the legitimacy of the state.
54
In a number of ways, these procedural laws remain a testament to the
discretionary nature of the Chinese judicial system. These laws codify fact-
based discretion and attempt to check self-interested discretion, but they also
encourage ideological discretion. Thus, they codify discretion through
vague terms that place greater powers in the hands of their judicial
interpreters. These laws codify informality by removing some cases from
the ambit of formal application of law to the more discretionary realm of
mediation. Both the Civil Procedure Law and the Criminal Procedure Law
formalize the "supervision" of judicial work through a procedure called
adjudication supervision. 55 This procedure allows final decisions to be
reopened by the courts, regardless of whether doing so benefits the parties.
In sum, the procedural laws systemically favor alternative dispute resolution
over adjudication, informal process over formal process, individualized
justice over strict application of law, and open-endedness and
reconsideration over finality and closure.56
A. Procedures Codifying Informality
Personal discretion and the emphasis on individual circumstance are
retained in the Chinese procedural laws through the use of general terms. As
Procedure Law, Trial Implementation], translated in LAWS OF THE PRC, 1979-1982, supra note 44, at 259-
95. The 1991 revision clarified a number of issues, including the time period during which a case must be
concluded, the conditions for prejudgment attachments, and the provisions on enforcement of judgments.
Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32. The 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (also translated as
Administrative Procedure Law) is the latest in the series. The Administrative Litigation Law expanded the
role of judges by creating procedures through which administrative discretion can be challenged in the
courts. Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 2.
54 According to critics of rule of law, courts simply serve to "eliminate a political foe of the regime
according to some prearranged rules." OTTO KRICHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL
PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS 6 (1961).
55 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 53, ch. 5; Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, ch. 16.
56 This is the converse of Harold Koh's description of U.S. procedure. See Harold Hongju Koh,
Three Cheers for Feminist Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139, 1201-03 (1993).
VOL. 8 No. [3
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CHINESE COURTS
H.L.A. Hart points out, some "open texture" at the borderlines of legal rules
is inevitable as "the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms
in any form of communication concerning matters of fact.",57 Yet, the open
texture found in the Chinese procedural laws is so consistently broad that
one may conclude that discretion has been purposefully built into them.
Unlike the Anglo-American system's adherence to precedent,
interpretation of statutes in China is done on a case-by-case basis, assisted
by internal regulations, and recently by the public interpretations and
opinions of the Supreme People's Court. While wide judicial discretion can
assist in creatively adapting laws to achieve individualized justice, it can
also lead to tremendous variations in the outcomes of similar cases, thereby
undermining the concept of a predictable legal system.58 This is particularly
problematic in criminal cases in which individual liberties are at stake.
This is not to say that the importance of formal procedure is lost on
the Chinese state. 59  Law reformers have argued successfully for greater
formal procedural regularity, resulting in substantial revisions of the Civil
Procedure Law in 1991 and the Criminal Procedure Law in 1996. These
revisions, such as the provisions in the revised Criminal Procedure Law
which delineate in greater detail the functions of lawyers, prosecutors, and
60judges, represent a major step in the direction of curbing discretion. Yet,
these laws still exhibit features of Maoist-socialist law-flexibility,
generality, and preoccupation with substantive justice.
For example, under the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, it is only with
the permission of the presiding judge that defense lawyers may state their
views on the evidence and the case.6' While the length of time that a
criminal defendant may be detained during investigation is limited to two
months, an extension may be granted in "grave or complex" cases where the
scope of the crime is broad and gathering evidence is difficult.62 Although a
suspect has a right to communicate with his family, this right may be
5' See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-25 (1961); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial
Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 359-60 (1975).58 The Anglo-American common law system uses the concept of precedent and stare decisis to adapt
old laws to changing morals and to alleviate the problem of inconsistent outcomes that can result from
judicial discretion in deciding cases that fall within the "open texture." According to the principle of stare
decisis, a judicial decision stands afterwards as authority for an identical or similar case or a similar
question of law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (5th ed. 1979).
59 See supra notes 32, 53 and accompanying text.
60 For a thorough critique of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, see TIMOTHY GELATT, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS (1993). For a thorough analysis of the revised 1996 Criminal
Procedure Law, see TIMOTHY GELATT, OPENING TO REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW (1996) [hereinafter OPENING TO REFORM?].
"' Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 53, art. 160.
62 Id. arts. 124-26.
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dispensed with if it would "hinder the investigation" or if there is "no way of
notifying them." 63 In both civil and criminal cases, while the basic people's
courts adjudicate ordinary cases of the first instance, the intermediate
people's courts and the higher people's courts have original jurisdiction over
"major cases" involving foreign parties and cases with "major impact." 64
Indeed, such open-textured terms have led to criticism that the Criminal
Procedure Law still does not meet international standards of due process65 or
the requirement of rule of law that "all laws should be prospective, open, and
clear.",
66
The procedural laws also preserve the Chinese preference for
informality through the codification of mediation. In the PRC, mediation
has historically been conducted outside of the judicial system through
informal, discretionary tribunals. Grassroots organizations, such as the
people's mediation and neighborhood residents' committees, as well as the
public security office, mediate an estimated seven to eight million civil cases
yearly.
67
In the Maoist era, such informal mediation played a strong ideological
role, serving to mobilize the masses through grassroots organizations.
68
Because of this history, informal mediation and the principle of "mediation
first, litigation second" have recently been criticized as popular justice and
69as leftist and dangerous. Others, however, view mediation as promoting
the traditional values of harmony and social order,70 and the legitimacy of
mediation has been promoted by codifying mediation under the aegis of the
courts. 71  Extrajudicial mediation has also been criticized because those
involved in this type of mediation are often untrained and sometimes
illiterate.
The Civil Procedure Law and, albeit in a more limited fashion, the
Criminal Procedure Law and the Administrative Litigation Law, specifically
provide for mediation as an important step prior to adjudication. The
63 Id. arts. 64, 71.
Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, arts. 19-20; Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 53, arts. 20-
21. 65 OPENING TO REFORM?, supra note 60, at 26-35.
66 JOSEPH RAz, supra note 15, at 214.67 See, e.g., 1992 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN ( 1992 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA] 875 (1993).
68 Fu Hualing, Understanding People's Mediation in Post-Mao China, 7 J. Chinese L. 211, 212-213
(1992).
69 Id.
'0 Id. at 216.
71 See Chapter VIII of the Civil Procedure Law, which contains an expanded procedure for formal
mediation by the people's courts. Some scholars, such as Donald Clarke, argue that this institutionalization
of mediation makes mediation an arm of the state. Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5 J.
CHINESE L. 245, 295 (1991).
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Criminal Procedure Law provides that certain minor offenses may be
privately prosecuted (that is, the victim can serve as the prosecutor in
bringing the accused to court) and mediated under the auspices of the
72court. The Administrative Litigation Law provides for mediation in cases
in which damages are sought but not in appeals of an administrative
decision.73 Most significant is the Civil Procedure Law, as amended in
1991, which includes an expanded chapter on mediation to encourage formal
mediation under the auspice of the court for all civil and economic cases,
even after a case has been filed.74 Article 85 codifies the principle of
individualized justice, providing that the people's court shall resolve cases
through mediation by "distinguishing right from wrong on the basis of facts
being clear.,
75
An example of this emphasis on mediation can be found in a recent
breach of contract claim brought by a construction company against the
Shagou County government. 76 The county government had signed a five-
year lease with the construction company, but when faced with the prospect
of leasing the space to the Agricultural Bank on more lucrative terms, it
issued a notice to evict the construction company. The construction
company sued the county government under the Administrative Litigation
Law. While maintaining the illegality of the county government's actions,
the Xuecheng District Court resolved the issue by taking an active role in
mediating the dispute, and ultimately helped the Agricultural Bank find
another site.
To be sure, the vagueness of the terminology in the procedural codes
and the formalization of mediation encourage the continued use of fact-
based discretion to provide individualized justice tailored to each case.
While the procedural codes also require that the contents of a mediated
agreement not violate the law, the process of mediation has no formalities
and is to be conducted according to the judge's innate sense of right and
72 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 53, art. 172. The revised Criminal Procedure Law limited
mediation in minor cases by providing that mediation shall not be conducted in cases for which
[T]he victims have evidence to prove that the defendants should be investigated for criminal
responsibility according to law because their acts have infringed upon the victim's personal or
property rights, whereas the public security organs or the People's Procuratorate do not
investigate or prosecute the criminal responsibility of the accused.
Id. arts. 170, 172.
13 Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 2, arts. 50, 67.
71 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, arts. 85-91.
71 Id. art. 85.
76 Li Jing, Xuecheng Fayuan "Min Gao Guan " Anjian Gao Jili [The Immediate Resolution of the
"Citizen Suing Official" Case in the Xuecheng District Court], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Mar. 21,
1995, at 2.
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wrong. Indeed, this procedure for mediation allows the courts to reach
compromised and individualized, but not always consistent, decisions.
B. Constraints on Self-Serving Discretion
The vagueness of procedural terms and the opportunities for informal
dispute resolution can provide an opening for self-serving discretion. The
Chinese government has attempted to address such discretion with limited
success. The government has promulgated regulations such as the Detailed
Implementing Regulations for the Interim Provisions Relating to
Administrative Sanctions for Corruption and Bribery by State
Administrative Personnel, the Circular on the Deadline for Government
Functionaries Who Are Guilty of Corruption and Bribery to Confess Their
Crimes of Their Own Accord, and the Supplementary Regulations on
Suppression of Corruption and Bribery.77  While it is unclear how
committed the leadership is to the enforcement of these measures, 78 recent
campaigns have resulted in some highly publicized prosecutions. Thus, the
Supreme People's Court boasted in 1997 that fifty judges were dealt with
strictly and sentenced for violations of law and discipline. 79
Within the laws on procedure, there have been several changes
directed at curbing judicial corruption. The amended Civil Procedure Law is
perhaps the best example of the effort in this area. It contained a new
provision prohibiting judges from "accepting any treat or gift from the
parties or their agents ad litem" and subjecting to criminal prosecution
77 Guojia Xingzheng Jiguan Gongzuo Renyuan Tanwu Huilu Xingzheng Chufen Zanxing Guiding
Shishi Xize [Detailed Implementing Regulations for the Interim Provisions Relating to Administrative
Sanctions for Corruption and Bribery by State Administrative Personnel] (issued Sept. 8, 1989), reprinted
in RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Sept. 22, 1989, at 6; Guanyu You Tanwulu Xingwei de Guojia
Xingzhen Jiguan Gongzuo Renyuan Bixu Zai Xianqinei Zhudong Jiaodai Wenti de Tonggao [Circular on
the Deadline for Government Functionaries Who Are Guilty of Corruption and Bribery to Voluntarily
Confess Their Crimes] (issued Aug. 19, 1989), reprinted in RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Aug. 20,
1989, at 2; Guanyu Chengzhi Zou Sifei de Buchong Guiding [Supplementary Regulations on Suppression
of Corruption and Bribery] (adopted Jan. 21, 1988), translated in Chinalaw (visited Oct. 27, 1999)
<http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw52.htm>.
78 Supervisory organs have complained of insufficient means and outlays for handling corruption
cases. Additionally, some leading cadres resist the fight against corruption and view running a clean
government as inconsistent with economic construction and a hindrance to production. Anticorruption
Campaign Faces Many Difficulties, MING PAO, Mar. 20, 1990, at 8, translated in FBIS-CHI, Mar. 22,
1990, at 24.
79 Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Court, XINHUA DOMESTIC SERVICE, Mar. 20, 1997,
translated in BRIT. BROADCASTING CORP. SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 16, 1997, available in
LEXIS, BBCMIR File. In 1995, 61 judicial officers received criminal punishment for violations of
discipline and law. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Supreme People's Court Work Report]
[hereinafter 1996 Supreme People's Court Work Report] 49, reprinted in 1997 ZHONGUO FALU NIANJIAN
[ 1997 CHINA LAW YEARBOOK] 44-50 (1997).
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judges who take bribes, play favorites, or engage in fraudulent conduct. 80
This provision was later bolstered by the new Judges Law, which
specifically prohibits judges from taking bribes or otherwise participating in
corrupt activities and subjects violators to criminal sanctions as well as
administrative warnings, demotions, and/or reductions of salary.8 ' The
Criminal Procedure Law, meanwhile, permits the reopening of a final
judgment if the judge, in trying the case, committed "acts of embezzlement,
bribery, or malpractices for personal gain, or bent the law in making the
judgment. ',82
The Civil Procedure Law also contains provisions to clarify the
jurisdictional power of local courts (particularly in contract actions) in an
attempt to curb local protectionism.83 It further strengthened the monitoring
of judicial work by the procuracy through an enhanced trial supervision
procedure.84 As will be discussed in greater detail below, such adjudication
supervision has functioned to increase judicial discretion as well as to curb
it.
The concept and existence of "personal relations" between judges and
litigants have not been eliminated. Recent reforms in civil and criminal trial
procedure notwithstanding, Chinese judges have typically had broad
responsibility for collecting evidence and investigating cases, thus leaving
room for discretionary conduct tainted by self-interest. In particular, judges
have not been constrained from going beyond the public record when
making decisions. There are also no prohibitions against ex parte contacts
with judges, meaning that one party may have full access to a judge without
the other's knowledge. Consequently, ample opportunity remains for
inappropriate information to influence the judge without an opportunity for
rebuttal by the opposing side.
C. Procedure Codifying Ideological Discretion
One final example of the retention of discretion within the procedural
framework may be found in the procedure of adjudication supervision
(shenpan jiandu). Adjudication supervision, as provided for in the Civil
Procedure Law, the Criminal Procedure Law, and the Administrative
go Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, art. 44.
81 Judges Law, supra note 25, arts. 30-32.
82 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 53, art. 204.
3 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, arts. 25-28; see also Professor Explains Civil Procedure Law
Revision, BEIJING XINHUA, available in FBIS-CHI, Apr. 4, 1991, at 38.
84 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, art. 185.
SEPT. 1999
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Litigation Law, allows for the discretionary reopening of final judgments by
the courts, in some instances irrespective of the wishes of the parties. 5 The
importance of adjudication supervision was reaffirmed in 1991 when
thirteen articles on supervision procedures were added to three different
chapters of the Civil Procedure Law.86 Theoretically, supervisory review isjustified by the need to monitor individual judicial work. As such,
supervisory review could be, and indeed has been, used to ensure
consistency and competency in judicial work by curbing personal discretion,
checking local protectionism, and changing unjust decisions.87
However, adjudication supervision can also undermine the rule of law
in a number of ways. First, supervisory review has few mechanisms to
ensure consistency in the cases reopened from court to court. Second, by
subjecting final decisions to discretionary reopenings, the procedure is in
tension with the predictability and regularity afforded by closed and final
judgments. Third, in allowing for liberal corrections of error, these codes
also show a resilient protection of ideological discretion.
The procedure for adjudication supervision is, by its nature, quite
discretionary. A party (or more problematically in a criminal case, the
procurator, a victim, the victim's family, or any citizen) can petition for the
reopening of a final decision.88 Until they were recently amended, neither
the civil nor the criminal procedure laws limited the grounds on which
reopenings could be based. In recognition of this problem, Chinese
legislators have attempted to limit the kinds of cases appropriate for
reopening in the amended civil and criminal procedure laws. 89 Thus, for
example, a people's court may retry a criminal case with a final judgment
only if there is "new evidence," if the evidence on which the original
judgment was based is "unreliable and insufficient," if the application of law
in the original judgment is "incorrect," or if the judge, in trying the case,
"committed acts of embezzlement bribery or malpractices for personal gain
or bent the law in making judgment., 90
The time period for reopening cases remains inconsistent. The
Criminal Procedure Law provides no time limits within which a reopening
85 See supra note 55; Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 2, arts. 63-64.
86 Professor Explains Civil Procedure Law Revision, supra note 83.
87 See generally Margaret Y. K. Woo, Adjudication Supervision and Judicial Independence in the
P.R.C., 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 95 (1991).8s Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 53, arts. 203-05; Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, art.
178. 89 These broad categories include cases with new evidence or insufficient evidence, erroneous
applications of the law, violations of legal procedure, and judicial misconduct. Civil Procedure Law, supra
note 32, arts. 179, 221.
90 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 53, art. 204.
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may occur. In 1991, the Civil Procedure Law was amended to limit the time
within which a civil litigant can seek adjudication supervision to two years
from the date of the final judgment. 91 The procurator in a civil case,
however, may invoke adjudication supervision at any future time.92
Furthermore, while a petition by a citizen to reopen a case must be reviewed
before the case can be reopened, a protest by the procurator's office
automatically reopens a case. 93 The retrial is a complete re-adjudication of
the facts and law by a new collegiate bench.94
The 1991 Civil Procedure Law also affirmed the supervisory role of
procurators in civil cases, thus formally injecting state policy into private
law and litigation. 95  The law added four provisions formalizing a
procurator's right to seek the reopening of final civil judgments.96 In
particular, a procurator may seek review of a civil judgment whether or not
the procuracy was originally a party to the case.97 In all retrials, the
procuracy must send its personnel to appear in court to oversee the process. 98
While supervisory review may limit the discretion of individual judges, it
can also increase the discretion, and hence the power, of courts vis-A-vis the
litigants. Notably, supervisory review gives courts the authority to reopen a
case regardless of the wishes of the litigants or whether reopening is
beneficial to the parties.
In stripping away the protections afforded by case closure,
adjudication supervision also operates to further the ideological discretion of
the courts. In particular, by rendering court decisions subject to change by
the state at any future time for broad categories of error, adjudication
supervision renders the work of the court subject to state involvement and
changes in central policies. While the retroactive application of new laws is
theoretically prohibited in China, retroactivity is the result when cases can
91 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, art. 182.
92 Id. art. 222.
9' Id. arts. 179, 186.
94 Xu Yichu, Lun Jianli Juyou Wo Guo Tedian de Xingshi Shenpan Jiandu Chengxu [On the
Establishment of the Unique Chinese Procedure of Adjudication Supervision], FAXUE YANJIU [STUD. IN
L.], no. 4 (1986), at 75.
95 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, art. 14. In 1991, the procuracy reportedly corrected 2,875
judicial decisions through adjudication supervision. 1991 ZHONGGUO JIANCHA NIANJIAN [1991 YEARBOOK
OF THE CHINESE PROCURACY] 366 (1992).
96 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, arts. 185-88; see also Professor Explains Civil Procedure
Law Revision, supra note 83.
9' Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, arts. 185-88. See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Jianchaguanfa [Public Procurators Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted Feb. 28, 1995)
[hereinafter Procurators Law] art. 18, translated in LAWS OF THE PRC, 1995, supra note 25, at 85-98; Shen
Jungui, Shilun Xingshi Zaishen Falu Guanxi [Legal Relationships in a Criminal Retrial], XIBEI ZHENGFA
XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. Nw. INST. L. & POL.], no. 2 (1988), at 40.
98 Procurators Law, supra note 97, art. 18.
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be reopened at a later time and reviewed pursuant to new policies, albeit not
pursuant to new laws. Thus, in 1988, the Supreme People's Court stated that
supervisory review should be most effectively used to reverse the policies of
the Cultural Revolution.99 Since then, supervisory review has been called
upon to serve another new policy of the state-to facilitate the reunification
of Taiwan with the mainland. Thus, in 1991, the Supreme People's Court
identified petitions for adjudication supervision by Taiwanese compatriots as
a category of cases meriting special attention.
0 0
Adjudication supervision has also begun to be used directly by the
political organs of the state. In 1990, the Standing Committee of the Shanxi
Provincial People's Congress, along with local governments, formed a
subcommittee of 134 people to review cases adjudicated by the intermediate
courts in the previous two years.' 0 ' Four months after the review, the
intermediate courts, using the procedures for adjudication supervision,
corrected 28 of the 38 cases that the subcommittee had found to be
incorrectly adjudicated. 10 2 If there is an increase in supervision of judicial
work by the people's congresses in conjunction with adjudication
supervision, the effect could be to further politicize judicial work in
China.
10 3
V. THE IDEOLOGY OF SUPERVISION
While Chinese judges seem to have broad procedural powers, their
work and decisionmaking authority is not unconstrained. To understand the
constraints on discretion in China's legal system, one must begin with an
examination of the system's elaborate grid of internal and external
supervision of individual judges. This elaborate supervisory structure
99 1988 Nian Qi Yue Shiba Ri Zai Dishisi Ci Quanguo Fayuan Gongzuo Huiyi Shang de Baodao,
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yuanzhang Ren Jianxin [Report of the President of the Supreme People's Court
Ren Jianxin at the Fourteenth Judicial Work Conference in Beijing on July 18, 1988] [hereinafter Supreme
People's Court Report] 12, reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN
GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], no. 3
(1988), at 3-16; see also Woo, supra note 87.
'0o Supreme People's Court Report, supra note 99. See also CPC Central Committee's Proposal for
Ten Year Development Programme and 8th Five Year Plan, BEIJING REv., Feb. 20, 1988, at 21, 27.
101 Wang Shengming, Weile Wanshan Fazhi Xitong Gongcheng [To Complete the Workings of Law],
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYS. DAILY], Oct. 15, 1990, at 2.
102 Satisfied with the success of this effort, the Shanxi People's Congress anticipates another review
of the court's work in the near future. Id.
103 Some scholars, however, have recently argued that the people's congresses may emerge as an
alternative source of power apart from the Party. See generally KEVIN O'BRIEN, REFORM WITHOUT
LIBERALIZATION: CHINA'S NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
(1990). For a more cautious note, see Tanner, supra note 45, at 87-88.
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reflects a traditional Chinese penchant for bureaucracy and also may be seen
as the embodiment of what can be called an "ideology of supervision." The
structure is perhaps most notable for what it does and does not constrain.
The concept of supervision, orjiandu, is one of the primary principles
the Chinese government has invoked to strengthen the legal system.'3 4 This
principle of supervision of public officials has antecedents in Chinese
history. In particular, the Chinese censure system was established to
supervise the imperial bureaucracy. 0 5 Modem day supervision is also
traceable to the Committee of People's Supervision, which was established
in the early years of the PRC and patterned after a Soviet prototype.106 As
Charles Hucker pointed out in his early analysis of the Committee of
People's Supervision, modem day supervision contains an element of
ideological control that was not present under the traditional system.10 7 In
the contemporary setting, supervision in China has encompassed supervision
by administrative superiors, by Party elders, and by the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference.
08
According to Wang Shuwen, vice-chairman of the law committee of
the National People's Congress ("NPC"), supervision of law enforcement
includes supervision by people's congresses (which have the authority to
supervise administrative, judicial, and procuratorial organs at the
corresponding levels), administrative supervision by upper-level
administrative organs over lower ones, and judicial supervision.109 Within
the -context of judicial supervision, the principle of supervision supplies
authority to numerous actors-the Supreme People's Court, upper-level
judicial officers, the procuracy, the people's congresses, and the masses-to
04 Chinese commentators have identified a problem they term "youfa buyi, jiandufali" (have law but
no compliance, supervision is weak). One perceived solution is strengthening supervision. As the report of
the Fourteenth Communist Party Congress pointed out, China "must complete the supervisory structure and
subject each administrative organ and government worker to effective supervision." Zhao Shengyin, Fanfu
Erti [Two Topics in Combating Corruption], MINZHU vU FAZHI [LAw & DEMONCRACY], no. 3 (1994), at 6.
105 See generally Charles 0. Hucker, The Traditional Chinese Censorate and the New Peking Regime,
45 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1041 (1951).
106 Id. at 1054-55.
'07 Id. at 1056-57.
1o8 Four Law Specialists Make Appeals-The Situation Whereby Laws Are Not Effectively Enforced
Badly Needs to Be Changed, BEIJING LIAOWANG [BEIJING OUTLOOK], translated in Specialists Discuss
Effective Law Enforcement, FBIS-CHI, Oct. 19, 1993, at 13.
109 According to Wang, supervision by the people's congresses includes supervision of administrative
organs, judicial organs, and procuratorial organs. Upper-level administrative organs have supervisory
authority over lower-level ones and specific supervisory departments have authority over state
administrative organs. The Supreme People's Court, meanwhile, has supervisory authority over all levels
of courts, and higher people's courts have supervisory authority over lower people's courts. The people's
procuracy has a unique role in supervising all legal work. Finally, supervision is also carried out by Party
organizations, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the masses. Id.
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challenge a judicial officer's decision. Interestingly, this principle of
supervision, while touted as a measure curbing self-interested discretion,
also has the inverse effect of facilitating ideological discretion.
The first line of supervision is, of course, the appeals process and the
four-tiered appellate structure that the Chinese share with courts in many
other countries. This structure includes a trial court, an intermediate court, a
higher people's court, and the Supreme People's Court. In recent years, the
Supreme People's Court has developed greater responsibility in guiding
lower court decisions by issuing a variety of official opinions (yijian),
explanations (jieda), answers (pifu), and notices (tongzhi). But supervision
in the Chinese legal system goes beyond the four-tiered appellate structure.
Closer examination reveals differences that give the Chinese judiciary an
interesting blend of limited authority but substantial discretion.
Chinese judges have less authority than their counterparts in Western
countries. Under the concept of youti zhengti (court as an organic whole),
the Chinese legal system treats the individual judge less as an individual
entity empowered to adjudicate and more as one component of the judicial
system."0 Indeed, according to Chinese legal theory, judicial independence
refers to independent adjudication by the court as a whole, not by the
individual judge."' The supervision of individual Chinese judges takes
several forms. For example, except for minor cases, judges preside not
alone, but in collegiate panels. Generally, judges follow the lead of the
presiding judge of the collegiate panel. All important judicial decisions
must also be examined and approved by the court president, the
administrative head of the court.'
1 2
More significantly, individual judges are subject to the supervision of
the adjudication committee (also translated as judicial committee). The
110 MINSHI SUSONG SHIYONG DAQUAN [COLLECTION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE LAWS] 249 (Liang
Shuwen ed., 1993)
"'While judicial independence in Western nations means that a judge administers justice
independently, subject to no outside interference, the Chinese concept is one of "the people's courts
administering justice independently, subject only to the law." People's Courts Organic Law, supra note 30,
art. 4. See also MINSHI SUSONG SHIYONG DAQUAN, supra note 110; Liao Guangsheng, "Independent
Administration of Justice" and the PRC Legal System, CHINESE L. & GOV'T, Summer-Fall 1983, at 123,
146-49.
112 Liao Guangshen, supra note 111, at 48 (citing Is it a Violation of the Law for the Court President
of Presiding Judge to Examine and Approve the Verdicts?, ZHONGGUO FAzHI BAO [CHINESE LEGAL SYS.
DAILY], Apr. 24, 1981); see also Liu Chunmao, Fayuanzhang, Tingzhang Shenpi Anjian de Zhidu
Yingdang Quxiao [The System of Requiring the Court President or Presiding Judge to Examine and
Approve Verdicts Should Be Abolished], MINZHU Yu FAZHI [LAW & DEMOCRACY], no. 1 (1981), at 30.
This system of approval and examination of cases by court presidents has caused judges to seek approval
prior to trial, thus creating a situation ofxianpian houshen (first decide, then try). Hikota Koguchi, Judicial
Independence in Post Mao China, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 195, 205 (1987). This was also confirmed in
interviews conducted by the author in 1998 and 1999.
VOL. 8 No. 3
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CHINESE COURTS
function of the adjudication committee is to "sum up judicial experience and
to discuss difficult and important cases and other issues relating to judicial
work."' 13  Hence, the adjudication committee, not the panel that actually
presides at trial, discusses and decides all "difficult and important" cases.
This procedure is said to result in the phenomenon of "verdict first, trial
second."'"14  Moreover, in difficult cases the adjudication committee may
even solicit the opinion of the higher court, thereby negating an aggrieved
party's opportunity to obtain unbiased review upon appeal." 5
Perhaps most significant is that court presidents and vice-presidents
who sit on the adjudication committee are generally Party members. In
"difficult" cases or cases with "policy" implications, adjudication
committees have even been known to solicit the advice of the local political-
legal committee of the Party and to follow Party recommendations.
Although today theoretically the Party cannot single out individual cases, in
practice it does not have to since most judges (as Party members) are
habitually sensitive to changing Party policies. 16 Party interests can thus be
institutionally represented in the judicial decisionmaking process through the
window of supervision.
Beyond these layers of internal court supervision, the ideology of
supervision operates to subject the judiciary to the external legal supervision
of the procuracy, the people's congress at the corresponding level, and
finally, the "masses. '  The procuracy, an institution imported from the
Soviet Union, represents the state and is primarily responsible not only for
investigating and prosecuting crimes, but also for supervising the
administration of justice. 18 In its supervisory role, the procuracy exercises
1 People's Courts Organic Law, supra note 30, art. 11. The adjudication committee is comprised of
the president and the vice-presidents of the court, the chief judge and associate chief judges of each
division of the court, and the chief procurator, who is a nonvoting member.
..4 The deliberations of the adjudication committee are not made public or revealed to the parties.
Decisions of the adjudication committee are reached by a majority vote of its members. ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGSHI SUSONGFA JIANMING JIAOCHENG [TEACHING MATERIAL FOR PRC
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES] 269 (1987).
115 The process of "tung qi," or "to clear the air," takes the form of lower court judges asking for
guidance from higher court judges. See SUN FEI, WOGUO XtNGSHI SUSONG DIER SHENCHENG XULUN
[TREATISE ON OUR COUNTRY'S CRIMINAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE] 48-49 (1986); see also Margaret Y.K.
Woo, The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People's Republic of China, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 118, 148
(1989).
16 Cohen, supra note 41, at 794.
"7 1982 PRC Constitution, supra note 44, art. 129.
.. Article 1 of the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates defines the procuracy as the "state
organ of legal supervision." Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Jianchayuan Zuzhifa [Organic Law of
the People's Procuratorates of the People's Republic of China] (adopted July 1, 1979) [hereinafter the
People's Procuratorate Organic Law] art. 1, translated in LAWS OF THE PRC, 1979-1982, supra note 44, at
80-86.
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authority over the investigatory activities of the public security organs-over
the activities of prisons, detention houses, and the agencies in charge of
reform through labor, and over the judicial activities of the courts and the
execution of judgments. 119  The scope and role of the procurator in
"supervising" judicial activities of the court, however, are much debated and
remain unclear.
In the early years of the PRC, legal supervision by the procuracy
entailed the review of judicial decisions, as well as of resolutions and
decrees of administrative bodies, to ensure that they conformed to the law.
However, this broad authorization was soon found to be too burdensome and
impractical in the complex Chinese bureaucracy.' 20  During the Cultural
Revolution, the procuracy, like the court system, was abolished."' It
reemerged in the 1978 Constitution adopted by the Fifth National People's
Congress and today has an uneasy relationship with the courts. 122  For
instance, the procuracy shares with the courts the responsibility of
interpreting law. 123 The Supreme People's Procuratorate, not the Supreme
People's Court, is empowered to interpret the specific application of laws
and decrees in the work of the procuracy. 24  Where the work of the
procuracy includes legal supervision of trial activities, the authority of the
procuracy to interpret laws relating to procuratorial work arguably places the
procuracy above the judiciary.
In a criminal case, the procuracy's participation is more clearly
defined and accepted. The procuracy can initiate cases, appeal erroneous
judgments, and seek the reopening of final judgments it deems incorrect.
125
"' Id. art. 5.
120 Xu Yichu, Lun Quanmian Chongfen Fahui Jiancha Jiguan Falu Jiandu de Zuoyong [Discussion
of How to Fully Utilize the Procuracy's Legal Supervision Powers], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL
STUD.], no. 4 (1987), at 43.
121 See generally S. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 28, at 68-72.
122 Id. See also Ke Lanming, Qian Yi Jiancha Jiguan Jiandu Minshi Songsu Shidu [To Discuss the
Role of the Procuracy in Supervising Civil Adjudication], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYS. DAILY], Oct. 1, 1990,
at 2.
123 Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jiaqiang Falu Jiesan Gongzuo de Jueding
[Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Providing an Improved
Interpretation of the Law] (adopted June 10, 1981), reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], July 6, 1981, at
21-22; see also Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE
L. 145, 164-65 (1993).
124 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Providing an
Improved Interpretation of the Law, supra note 123.
125 See, e.g., Civil Procedure Law, supra note 32, art. 184. Article 184 states that "the Supreme
People's Procuratorate shall lodge a protest against the legally effective judgment or ruling rendered by a
people's court at any level, and a superior people's procuratorate against the legally effective judgment or
ruling rendered by a subordinate people's court according to the procedure ofjudicial supervision ..... Id.
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While the procurator representing the state is an indispensable party in a
criminal case, the same is not necessarily true in a civil case between two
private parties. Thus, in the last ten years, while the procuracy has had "the
right of legal supervision over judicial work," it has not fully exercised this
authority in civil cases. 12 6 The role of the procuracy in civil cases continues
to be debated. The prevailing sentiment appears to be that the procuracy can
intervene, but that its intervention is limited to cases affecting state
interests.127  Of course, this principle is broad enough to include all civil
cases, since Maoist socialist ideology defines the interests of the people and
the interests of the state as one. 
28
Finally, the Chinese government also asserts the importance of
supervision of judicial work by the "masses," 129 and, most recently, by the
people's congresses, as part and parcel of minzhu jiandu (democratic
supervision). 130  Supervision by the masses takes the form of ordinary
citizens writing letters, sending petitions, or making phone calls to
supervisory organs. 13  Discussions regarding the establishment of a mass
media law have also made the point that such media are an important arm of
the "mass" supervision of legal work.
32
The people's congresses-bodies of deputies elected (under Party
supervision) from the local to the national levels-are the closest China
comes to representative bodies. Peng Chong of the National People's
Congress defined supervision by the people's congresses as follows: "In
major cases, the people's congress may request a report from the people's
procuracy and the courts, and also conduct its own investigation. If [the
people's congress] finds error, it may ask the procuracy or the courts to
126 Ding Mouying & Yang Qiguo, Jiancha Jiquan Shixing Minshi Susong Jiandu Jige Wenti de
Tantao [Discussion of Several Questions Relating to the Procuracy's Role in Supervising Civil Cases],
ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL STUD.], no. 5 (1988), at 77.
127 See id.
128 Thus, Mao wrote, "[T]he individual is an element of the collective. When collective interests are
increased, personal interests will subsequently be improved." See A. Nathan, Sources of Chinese Rights
Thinking, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, 123, 141 (R. Edwards et. al. eds., 1986) (citing
Miscellany ofMao Tse-tung Thought (1949-1968), Joint Publication Research Service, June 12, 1969, at
250.) The Chinese conception of rights and laws also emphasizes the idea that law is designed not simply
to protect individual interests, but rather to enable individuals to meet their duties to the state. Qiu Ye, Lun
Falu Zuanli he Yiwu de Tongyi Xing [On the Unity of Rights and Duties in Law], FAXUE YANJIU [STUD. IN
L.1, no. 3 (1990), at 16; see also, Margaret Y. K. Woo, Courts, Justice and Human Rights, in CHINA
BRIEFING 1992, at 95 (William A. Joseph ed., 1992).
129 Judges Law, supra note 25, art. 7(7).
130 Wu Naitao, Offence Reporting: An Important Channel of Mass Supervision, BEIJING REV., Jan.
15-21, 1990, at 26.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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correct the case according to law."'133 China's 1982 Constitution provided
for supervision of the courts by the people's congresses. 134 The provision,
however, has been brought into active use only in the last few years and
remains controversial.'35
In the 1980s, deputies of the people's congress assigned to carry out
supervision of the courts tended to be of much lower rank than the secretary
of the political-legal committee to whom courts and procurators frequently
reported. Thus, it was unclear whether their supervisory activities were
particularly effective. 136  In recent years, efforts have been made to
strengthen the authority of the people's congresses. As recently as May
1995, Hubei Province's highest court issued a directive on improving
"acceptance of supervision by people's congresses.' ' 137  This directive
instructed lower courts to submit timely reports of all important cases, along
with their decisions and "Party guidance," to the people's congresses for
review. 138
Like all other activities, inspection of the courts by the people's
congresses must theoretically be carried out under the guidance of the
Communist Party. Indeed, supervision by the people's congresses is often
instigated by particular policy concerns of the central government. For
example, in 1993, after the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party issued instructions on the comprehensive
management of public security, the NPC sent two inspection groups to four
provinces and autonomous regions to examine the implementation of the
Decision on Strengthening the Comprehensive Management of Public
Security. 139 Similarly, in anticipation of the United Nations Fourth World
133 Hu Dezu, Dui Renda Jiqi Changweihui Jige Jiandu Xingshi de Tantao [A Discussion of the
Various Kinds of Supervision by the People's Congresses and the Standing Committees], FAZHI RIBAO
[LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Nov. 1, 1990, at 3.
134 1982 PRC Constitution, supra note 44, art. 3.
:35 Ding Mouying & Yang Qiguo, supra note 126.
36 Kevin O'Brien, Chinese People's Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: Understanding
Early Organizational Development, 27 COMP. POL. STUD. 80, 92, 98 (1994). The 1992 Law Governing
Deputies to the National People's Congresses and to the Local People's Congresses at Various Levels
includes detailed articles on inspection and supervision by the people's congresses. See generally Quanguo
Renmin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui Daibiaofa [Law of the People's Republic of
China on Deputies to the National People's Congresses and to the Local People's Congresses at Various
Levels] (adopted Apr. 3, 1992), translated in The Law Governing Deputies to the National People's
Congress, FBIS-CHI, Apr. 14, 1992, at 1-5.
137 Feng Yunjiang, Jiandu Renda Jiandu Gaijin Fayuan Gongzuo [Accept People's Congress
Supervision, Improve the Work of the Courts], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], May 7, 1995, at 1.
138 id.
139 Zhang Sutang & Wu Hengguan, Ren Jianxin Addresses the 10th Plenary Session of the Central
Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security and Stresses Severe Punishment for
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Conference on Women held in Beijing in September of 1995, the NPC
Standing Committee organized four inspection groups and sent them to eight
provinces to inspect the implementation of the Law on the Protection of
Women's Rights and Interests. 140 Also in 1995, the NPC reported the work
of five inspection task forces in the provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang,
Liaoning, Henan, and Fujian, which had been dispatched to examine
problems identified by the masses in the areas of consumer protection, rural
development, and local protectionism. 141
There are, therefore, numerous actors in the Chinese system who have
de jure responsibility to supervise the work of individual judges: the
adjudication committee, the court president, the procuracy, the people's
congresses, the masses, and, ultimately, the Communist Party. With
supervision, the work of individual judges in China can be quite constrained.
While there has been growing discussion in the academic community about
allowing the individual judge to "administer justice independently according
to law,"' 142 many judges in China prefer to defer decisionmaking to
adjudication committees, relegating themselves to simply an administrative
role. 14
3
The recent focus on promoting supervision of legal work
demonstrates China's growing concern with law enforcement generally and,
in particular, the need to balance individual discretion with procedural
regularity in judicial decisionmaking. Yet, while supervision can restrict the
personal discretion of an individual judge, it can also be a window for
ideological discretion. In supporting the guidance of the Party and funneling
judicial work to higher authorities who are usually Party members or even
deputy Party secretaries, supervision can ensure greater ideological
compliance. Thus, while the discretion of an individual judge may be
constrained, the court as a whole retains broad ideological discretion.
The ideology of supervision embedded in this framework of
supervision may be better understood in light of the principle of democratic
centralism, which applies to the operation of all governmental units in the
Criminals, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Oct. 28, 1993, at 113, translated in Ren Jianxin Urges
Fightin Against Crime, FBIS-CHI, Nov. 9, 1993, at 14-15.
'4 NPC Standing Committee About to Inspect the Implementation of the Law on the Protection of
Women's Rights and Interests, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], overseas ed., Feb. 13, 1995, at 4.
141 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Gongzuo Baogao [The Work Report of
the NPC Standing Committee], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Mar. 23, 1995, at 1.
142 See, e.g., Ye Qing, Zhushen Faguan Zeren Zixi [Responsibility of the Principal Judge], FAXUE
[LEGAL STUD.], no. 7 (1995), at 21-23; Li Jianming, Xingshi Shenpan Chengxu Gaige De Jidian Shikao
[Thinking About the Reform of Criminal Justice], FAXUE YANJIU [STUD. IN L.], no. 1 (1995), at 84, 87.
143 Ka Changjiu, Court Reform, FAXUE [LEGAL STUD.], no. 1 (1990), at 147, 150.
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PRC.144 The principle of democratic centralism functions to ensure that the
minority is subordinated to the majority, the lower to the higher, the
individual to the organization, and the locality to the center.145 Thus, for
instance, within a collegiate panel of judges on a case, the principle of
democratic centralism dictates that judges in the minority subordinate their
views to those of the majority. Similarly, under the principle of democratic
centralism, the collegiate panel of judges must subordinate its views to those
of the adjudication committee 146 and submit itself to supervision by the
procuracy and the people's congresses.
This elaborate supervisory system is indicative of the court's role in
the Chinese political system as an administrative bureaucracy, subject to
supervision, and not yet fully empowered to supervise other institutions.
Indeed, while a court is expected to strictly enforce the law, its authority to
be the final interpreter of substantive law is evolving, and courts generally
have not been viewed as having the authority to make law. 147  To date,
courts are not authorized to supervise lawmaking by challenging the validity
or inconsistencies of laws that have been properly implemented. Perhaps
what is needed is an extension of the ideology of "supervision."
VI. EXTENSION OF THE IDEOLOGY OF "SUPERVISION"
As demonstrated in the discussion above, human discretion and the
arbitrary state seep into the judicial process to shape China's formal
procedural rules. The result is a set of procedures that provides ample
opportunities to change, or, in the parlance of Chinese ideology, to
"supervise," judicial decisions. This ideology of supervision and its
attendant procedures reflect the dominance of the state, which supports
procedural regularity only to the extent of curbing personal abuses, and not
to the extent of curbing the arbitrary powers of the central government.
Missing from the system are ways to challenge unjust laws themselves.
144 Article 3 of the PRC Constitution provides: "The state organs of the PRC apply the principle of
democratic centralism." 1982 PRC Constitution, supra note 44, art. 3.
:45 Liao Guangshen, supra note 11l, at 147.
146 Article 11 of the People's Court Organic Law states, "[p]eople's courts at all levels shall set up
judicial committees which shall practice democratic centralism." People's Court Organic Law, supra note
30, art. 11. See also THE GENERAL OFFICE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1988).
This volume specifies that "the determinations of the judicial committee must be implemented by the
collegiate panel." Id. at 8.
14' Ren Jianxin Discusses Law on Judges, BEIJING XINHUA, Mar. 1, 1995, translated in FBIS-CHI,
Mar. 21, 1995, at 24-26.
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While individuals can challenge discretionary decisions in China, they
can challenge those decisions only on the grounds that they are "not in
accordance with the law."'148  For example, the Administrative Litigation
Law provides for challenges to administrative abuses and the correction of
cases "according to law.' 49 To prevail, a complainant in an administrative
litigation must show a violation of a specific administrative rule.150  The
problem, however, is that the laws themselves (as well as their
interpretation) are subject to wide swings in Party policy.
When China has launched national campaigns to combat crime in the
past, some of the procedural protections guaranteed by the Criminal
Procedure Law have not been honored in practice. This has meant ignoring
procedural protections completely, or, increasingly, changing and
reinterpreting procedural rules to meet the needs of the campaign. During
the 1983 anti-crime campaign, emergency measures such as shortened time
periods for delivery to defendants of bills of prosecution and summons and
notice, as well as abbreviated trials and appeals, were adopted for the
purpose of "quickly and severely punish[ing] criminals who seriously
endanger public security."' 151 During this period, the appeals procedure was
amended so that the approval of only a provincial higher people's court was
required for death sentences in cases of murder, robbery, rape, bombing,
arson, and sabotage. 5
2
148 See, e.g., Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 2, art. 5; Xingzheng Fuyi Tiaoli [Regulations
on Administrative Reconsideration] (issued Dec. 24, 1990, amended Oct. 24, 1994) [hereinafter
Regulations on Administrative Consideration] arts. 1-2, reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], Oct. 24,
1994, 982-990. The recently adopted Administrative Supervision Law of the PRC, however, provides for
the possibility of more liberal challenges to administrative acts. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng
Jianchafa [Administrative Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted May 9, 1997)
[hereinafter Administrative Supervision Law], available in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOWUYUAN
GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], May 15, 1997, 665-
672. Article 23(3) provides that supervisory organs may recommend supervision in situations of
"infringements upon state and collective interests and legitimate interests of citizens that require remedial
measures." Id. art. 23.
"9 Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 2, art. 5.
"o Id. arts. 3, 5.
1s Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Yancheng Yanzong Weihai
Shehui Anding de Fanzui Fenzi de Jueding [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress Regarding the Procedure for Prompt Adjudication of Cases Involving Criminals Who Seriously
Endanger Public Security] (issued Sept. 2, 1983), translated in LAWS OF THE PRC, 1983-1986, supra note
30, at 32-34. Defendants who were considered to seriously endanger public security and whose alleged
crimes could be punished by death could be quickly brought to trial. Id. The restrictions regarding the time
limit for delivery to the defendant of the bill of prosecution and the summons and notices were
overstepped. Id. The ten-day period for appeal was shortened to three days. Id.
'5 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Sixing Anjian Hezhun Wenti de
Jueding [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding Approval of
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Similarly, after the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the Chinese
government again emphasized the need "to deal severely with crime" and
instituted an "anti-crime campaign against the six vices": gambling,
prostitution, pornography, trafficking of women and children, the sale and
abuse of drugs, and the use of feudal superstition to defraud. 53 As a result
of this emphasis on the prosecution of crimes, the people's courts passed
judgment on 482,658 accused people, a significant increase from the
previous year.' 54  Again, for some of the people prosecuted as part of this
crackdown, including many of the pro-democracy movement participants,
some of the procedural protections guaranteed by the Chinese legal codes
were ignored. 1
55
The concept of "rule of law" requires restraint on arbitrariness not
only in the application of law, but also in the making of law. While there are
limited circumstances in which administrative rulings may be nullified for
inconsistency with statutes, 156 there are no procedures through which a
citizen can challenge the validity of a formally enacted statute. Without
such a mechanism, there is no process through which to challenge legal
procedures such as the "emergency" criminal procedures adopted during the
anti-crime campaigns. In recent years, some Chinese scholars have argued
for (and there have been some efforts toward) the establishment of a
Cases Involving the Death Sentence] (issued June 10, 1981), translated in LAWS OF THE PRC, 1979-1982,
supra note 44, at 250.
153 Jiao Qingle, Bushu Guichu, Malyin, Piaochang Deng "Liu Hai" Gongzuo [On the Work of
Eliminating the "Six Vices'], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Nov. 14, 1989, at 1.
154 1989 Niande Shenpan Gongzuo [1989 Report on Judicial Work], 1990 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN
[1990 CHINA LAW YEARBOOK] 39 (1990). By contrast, the number of people convicted in 1988 was
368,790. 1988 Niande Shenpan Gongzuo [1988 Report on Judicial Work], 1989 ZHONGGuO FALu
NIANJIAN [ 1989 CHINA LAW YEARBOOK] 8 (1989).
'55 Immediately after the June 4, 1989 movement, there were a number of legislative responses which
were designed to keep closer track of citizens and restrict the manner in which social and political activities
take place. See generally Margaret Y. K. Woo, Legal Reforms in the Aftermath of Tiananmen Square, 17
REV. SOCIALIST L. 51 (1991).
156 Article 23 of the Administrative Supervision Law, promulgated in 1997, provides for supervisory
review of "decisions, orders, and directives issued by departments of people's governments," which can be
"corrected or withdrawn for contradicting laws, regulations, or state policies." Administrative Supervision
Law, supra note 148, art. 23. Similarly, Article 43 of the Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration,
as amended in 1994, provides for reconsideration of "rules, decisions, and orders with general binding
force" if they are in conflict with "laws and regulations or other rules, decisions, or orders with general
binding force." Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration, supra note 148, art. 43. While these
enactments may seem to open the door to challenges to "laws and regulations" themselves, neither actually
goes that far. In fact, Article 10 of the Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration specifically
prohibits challenges to regulations by providing that "citizens, legal persons, or other organizations shall
not file an application for reconsideration in accordance with these regulations if they are not satisfied with
... administrative regulations, rules, decisions, and orders with a general binding force." Id. art. 10.
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legislative procedure to curb when and how laws may be changed. 157 More
interestingly, there has also been discussion of extending the ideology of
supervision to encompass constitutional supervision, that is, the enforcement
of the PRC Constitution as a higher law that could serve as a check on the
discretion of the national government and, more importantly, the Party.' 58
There is a kernel of the concept of constitutional supervision in the
increased role of the legislature and the Supreme People's Court in the
interpretation of law. However, there has been no movement to formally
empower the court or another body, such as a legislative council, to review
legislation to ensure its constitutionality or to decide political disputes
among the branches and levels of the government.
The one potential mechanism for constitutional challenge currently
contained in the PRC Constitution is a provision which permits individuals
to submit shensu petitions.' 59 A shensu petition is a letter of complaint that
an individual may submit to challenge the abuse of official power. In recent
years, thousands of shensu petitions have been submitted challenging
judicial decisions in criminal cases.160  Yet, while the PRC Constitution
allows aggrieved parties to register petitions, there is at present neither a
constitutional court to hear these petitions nor any method to separate
constitutional claims of procedural violations from nonconstitutional claims.
At present, therefore, shensu petitions are viewed as a burden on the legal
system. 61 There is no jurisprudence by which unjust laws can be challenged
other than by appeals to the "mandate of heaven."
'57 The NPC is currently debating a draft of the Legislation Law which, if passed, will regulate and
guide the process of lawmaking. Chinese Parliament Standing Committee Studies Draft to Ensure Rule of
Law, XINHUA, Oct. 29, 1999, reprinted in BRIT. BROADCASTING CORP. MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC-
POLITICAL, Oct. 30, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asia Pacific News File.
158 See Zhen Yunsheng, Tizhi Gaige Yu Xianfa Shenpian [System Reform and Constitutional
Supervision], FAXUE YANJIU [STUD. IN L.], no. 9 (1988), at 5-11.
"5' 1982 PRC Constitution, supra note 44, art. 41.
160 In 1988, the petitions court handled 3,570,685 letters and 4,175,204 visits. Shensu petitions
constitute about 75.6% of this number. 1988 Nian de Shenpan Gongzuo [Judicial Work Report of 1988],
reprinted in 1989 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJtI [1989 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA] 10 (1989). In 1995, the
people's courts handled a total of 6.36 million visits and letters from the masses. Of this number, 640,000
presented petitions. 1996 Supreme People's Court Work Report, supra note 79, at 49.
161 The Supreme People's Court has issued regulations that encourage courts to educate and
"persuade" persistent petitioners to withdraw their petitions. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Geji Renmin
Fayuan Chuli Xingshi Anjian Shensu de Zanxing Guiding [Provisional Stipulation of the Supreme People's
Court on the Handling of Petitions in Criminal Cases] (issued Oct. 10, 1989) art. 15, reprinted in FAZHI
RIBAO [LEGAL SYS. DAILY], Oct. 25, 1989, at 2; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Geji Renmin Fayuan
Chuli Minshi he Jingji Jiufen Anjian Shensu de Zanxing Guiding [Provisional Stipulation of the Supreme
People's Court on the Handling of Petitions in Civil Cases] (issued July 12, 1989), reprinted in FAZHI
RIBAO [LEGAL SyS. DAILY], Aug. 26, 1989, at 2.
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VII. CONCLUSION
China today remains ambivalent about formal legal rules and the rule
of law. This ambivalence was aptly depicted in a recent film, The Story of
Qiu ju. 162 In the film, the heroine Qiu Ju seeks justice for her husband, who
has been wrongfully beaten by the village chief for challenging the chief's
arbitrary denial of permission to put up a storage shed. Seeking justice, Qiu
Ju first brings a citizen complaint to the public security office, where it is
informally mediated. The public security officer suggests that the chief pay
for the husband's medical bills and the chief agrees to do so. Qiu, who
wants an apology, is dissatisfied with the outcome and seeks review in the
higher office of the public security. When the original officer's decision is
affirmed by the higher office, Qiu seeks the assistance of a lawyer to file suit
in court and challenge the decision as not "according to law."
Once the force of formal law is brought to bear, events spiral out of
control. After losing again in the trial court, Qiu Ju appeals to a higher
court. Her appeal brings further investigation by the procuracy, resulting in
a higher court judgment that finds the chief guilty of assault and orders him
detained for ten days. This judgment arrives, however, on the heels of a
heroic effort by the village chief to save Qiu Ju when a difficult childbirth
threatens her life. Qiu Ju is stunned when she hears of the chief's arrest and
runs after the car that is taking him off to jail.
Realistic or not, the film conveys a strong sense that the legal system
is inadequate to provide a just result. Qiu Ju had wanted an apology, a
remedy the legal system did not and could not provide. Instead, strict
application of the law resulted in an arrest and imprisonment, a result Qiu Ju
did not want at all. While the rule of law is necessary to curb local abuses,
formal application of law in this instance did not take into account the
complex relationships between local chiefs and villagers or the individual
relationship between Chief Wang and Qiu Ju.
This film's ambivalence about the strict application of law is also
reflected in China's procedural laws. Undeniably, these procedural codes,
along with the recent Judges Law and other laws such as the Lawyers Law
and the Procurators Law163 represent efforts to temper personal, self-serving
162 The film was made by the noted filmmaker Zhang Yimou. Interestingly, the film itself generated
a civil lawsuit brought by an individual who sued the film company for civil damages for using her images
in portions of the film without her permission. That lawsuit is discussed as case number 104, in HIGHER
PEOPLE'S COURT TRAINING CENTER 355-58 (1996).
163 Judges Law, supra note 25; Procurators Law, supra note 97; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Lushifa [Law of the PRC on Lawyers] (adopted May 15, 1996), translated in LAWS OF THE PRC 1996,
supra note 53, at 159-71.
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discretion by enhancing professional competency and consistency. These
procedural laws can ensure greater regularity in the application of enacted
law and, hence, greater justice in ordinary cases. Yet, the procedural laws
still preserve personal discretion in decision-making through the use of
vague and general terms and through the codification of mediation. The
Chinese judge can go beyond black letter law to consider a wide variety of
facts and variables in rendering justice that will preserve harmony and social
relations. Thus, the procedural laws codify equity in their formal
requirements.
Ultimately, the rule of law may also be compromised because these
laws do not allow challenges to ideological discretion. In contrast to efforts
to curb self-serving personal discretion, less has been done to check
ideological discretion. In fact, efforts to curb individual discretion, such as
the example of adjudication supervision, can have the inverse effect of
increasing systemic ideological discretion. Procedural laws serve to affirm,
but not challenge, the authority of the central government. Indeed, while
they provide the basis for challenges to discretionary decisions rendered "not
in accordance to law," they do not allow challenges to the validity of the
substantive and procedural laws themselves.
China has made much progress in ensuring procedural regularity, but
China's legal system still accords the individual judge limited authority
within the boundaries of greater discretion. In sum, the system remains
more a system of discretion supplemented by law than a system of law
supplemented by discretion.
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